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Abstract 
In repeated number guessing games choices typically converge quickly to the Nash 
equilibrium. In positive expectations feedback experiments, however, convergence to 
the equilibrium price tends to be very slow, if it occurs at all. Both types of 
experimental designs have been suggested as modeling essential aspects of financial 
markets. In order to isolate the source of the differences in outcomes we present 
several new experiments in this paper. We conclude that the feedback strength (i.e. 
the ‘p-value’ in standard number guessing games) is essential for the results.  
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 1. Motivation 
In a famous quote Keynes (1936) describes financial investment as a game in which 
players try to predict average predictions: 
 
“...professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which 
the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, 
the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to 
the average preferences of the competitors as a whole...”
1  
 
This beauty contest analogy is often cited in papers on higher order beliefs
2 and has 
inspired an increasing number of theoretical and experimental contributions to 
economics and finance (for a recent theoretical study see e.g. Allen et al., 2006). Most 
experiments focus on (variations of) the so-called number guessing game (see e.g. 
Nagel, 1995). In this game all players have to simultaneously submit a ‘guess’ from a 
certain interval (typically 0-100) and the winner is the player whose choice is closest 
to a given fraction (typically 2/3) of the average of these chosen numbers. This game 
has a unique Nash-equilibrium and the distance between a specific guess and the 
equilibrium value can be considered a measure of the belief this player has about the 
rationality of the population of players, and about the distribution of the higher order 
beliefs about rationality in the population. 
The general findings from the experimental literature on repeated number 
guessing games are that first period choices are not very close to the Nash equilibrium 
but convergence to that equilibrium is fast (typically within 4-5 periods) and stable. 
As a characterization of behavior of financial markets this fast convergence is 
surprising for at least two reasons.  












and Nagel (1997) and Ho et al. (1998). First, empirical evidence suggests that asset markets are in fact not that stable. 
Shiller (1981, 2000), for example, shows that stock prices are excessively volatile: 
their variance is higher than that of the underlying fundamental value. Behavioral 
finance (for recent overviews see Shleifer, 2000, Barberis and Thaler, 2003) has 
shown that (1) many price movements are unrelated to news but are reactions to price 
changes (for example caused by investors using technical analyses) and that (2) prices 
under-react to news, causing short-term trends. Mis-pricing cannot always be 
arbitraged away (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and market prices may therefore deviate 
substantially from their fundamental values for a longer period of time. Mis-pricing 
and over- and under-reaction has also been established experimentally. Smith et al. 
(1988) discuss experimental asset markets that feature bubbles and crashes in asset 
prices.  Noussair et al. (2001) show that these bubbles and crashes even emerge when 
the fundamental value is constant, instead of deterministically decreasing.  Kirchler 
(2009) establishes under-reaction in an experimental asset market with a fluctuating 
fundamental value.  Finally, in an expectation feedback experiment with some large 
permanent shocks to the fundamental value, Bao et al. (2010) argue that there may be 
under-reaction of realized prices to these shocks in the short run, but over-reaction in 
the long run.  
Second, evidence from expectations feedback experiments (see e.g. Hommes 
et al., 2005, 2008, Heemeijer et al., 2009) does not seem to be consistent with the 
results from number guessing game experiments. Expectations feedback experiments 
are based upon the idea that asset markets (just like many other economic 
environments) are expectations feedback systems. Price expectations of traders 
determine their trading behavior which, in turn, determines the realized trading price. 
In an expectations feedback experiment participants have to submit their forecast of 
the future price of a certain asset and are paid according to their prediction accuracy. 
A computer program determines the optimal trades associated with the forecasts and 
the resulting realized trading price. The advantage of this design over traditional 
experimental asset markets is that it gives a clearer picture of how people form 
expectations in expectations feedback environments.
3  In prediction experiments with 
a positive expectations feedback (that is, where an increase in average predictions 
                                                 
  2
3 In more traditional asset market experiments participants are also sometimes asked to submit price 
predictions, but it is difficult to give the appropriate incentives for providing these predictions and often 
they come about as a by-product to the experiment. For a more rigorous approach to expectation 
formation in experimental asset markets, see Haruvy et al. (2007). leads to an increase in the realized market price) there is a remarkable tendency for 
participants to coordinate on a common prediction strategy but no (or only slow) 
convergence to the equilibrium price. 
These positive feedback prediction experiments are closely related to the 
number guessing game, but with very different results.
4 Nevertheless, the 
experimental designs do differ in a number of dimensions, particularly the feedback 
strength from expectations (guesses) to realized price (target number), the information 
given to the participants, and the incentive structure. It is, a priori, not evident which 
of these design differences is responsible for the differences in outcomes. This paper 
reports on a series of experiments that are designed to isolate the main determinants. 
Our main finding is that only feedback strength has a substantial impact upon 
convergence, although it does not seem to have a significant effect upon prediction 
accuracy or coordination of expectations. Providing more information to the 
participants, and/or introducing a winner-takes-all incentive scheme has no significant 
effect upon convergence, prediction accuracy or coordination, although the winner-
takes-all incentive scheme does lead to a substantial increase in the number of 
“spoilers”, i.e. sudden large and erratic deviations in individual predictions.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will 
briefly review the experimental literature on number guessing games and positive 
expectations feedback experiments and discuss the differences in design 
characteristics and outcomes between these two types of experiments. The design of 
five new experimental studies will be briefly discussed in Section 3 and the results of 
these new experimental studies will be analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Number Guessing Games and Expectation Feedback Experiments 
2.1 Number guessing games 
The typical number guessing game experiment has the following structure.
5 The game 
is played for T  periods with a fixed group ofH  participants. In each period t 
                                                 
4  When we started our experimental research on expectation feedback markets we were not fully aware 
of the close connection with guessing games. This connection only became apparent to us when we 
changed from using a market-clearing environment (Hommes et al., 2005), where participants had to 
predict two periods ahead, to a market-maker environment (Heemeijer, et al., 2009) where participants 
o ly have to predict one period ahead (in Section 2 2 we will discuss the differences between these two 




5  Moulin (1986) was the first to discuss this game. participants simultaneously choose numbers   from the interval 
e
t h x ,   u l, . The so-called 
target number is given as
6 
e
t h t x x ,     ,                   (1) 
where  0    and  1 0     are fixed parameters












,  is the average 
number chosen in period  . The participant for which  t t
e
t h x x  ,  is smallest wins a 
prize in that period. If several participants have the best guess the prize is split evenly 
between them. The rules of the game are common knowledge and between periods 
participants receive feedback about the previous periods’ guesses of all participants, 
the target number and the winning number. 
From (1) it is easy to see that the Nash equilibrium of the number guessing 






* x , provided  : if all participants choose   
the target number indeed equals  . Alternatively, this equilibrium can be found by 
iterative elimination of dominated strategies.
u l  x 
* *





Finding the Nash equilibrium, for example by iterative elimination of 
dominated strategies, requires a (potentially infinite) number of steps of reasoning. 
The number guessing game is a powerful device to study this depth of reasoning, as 
follows. So-called level-0 players randomly select a guess from the interval . A  u l,
                                          





7  Most of the guessing games restrict attention to  1 0    , but some of the earlier studies did 




discuss treatments with  1 . 1    and  1 3 .   . Moreover, Sutan and Willinger (2009) discuss 
experiments on a guessing game with negative feedback, i.e. 0   , and show that it converges 
faster than the (positive feedback) guessing game with   0  . On the impact of the sign of the 
edback, also see Heem fe eijer et al. (2009).  
8  This works as follows. Given that choices have to be in the interval   u l, the target number 
always lies in the interval u l       ,  . Numbers outside this interval are dominated and 
can therefore be eliminated. Assuming that no participant chooses a dominated action it follows 
that the target number must lie in the interval       u l             , . This implies 




  4level-1 player believes all other players are level-0 players, and therefore plays a best 
response to the expected random choice of the level-0 players, , where   
corresponds to the expected average choice of the level-0 players.
0 1 x x    
0 x
9 A level-2 player 
believes that all other players are level-1 players and therefore best responds to , 
that is, , and so on. By looking at first period choices the number 
guessing game can be used to classify subjects into different depth of reasoning types.  
1 x
1 2 x x    
The number guessing game has been studied extensively in laboratory 
experiments (for overviews, see Nagel, 1999, and Camerer et al., 2003), typically with 
0    and very often with 
3
2
   and    100 , 0 ,  u l . The first of these experiments 
was reported by Nagel (1995) who considered groups of 15-18 participants playing 
the game for four periods. Her main conclusions are: (i) First period choices are 
significantly different from the Nash equilibrium prediction
10 and almost all of these 
choices correspond to level-0 up to level-3 depth of reasoning; (ii) In subsequent 
periods there is rapid convergence to the Nash-equilibrium, without an increase in the 
depth of reasoning. 
These results have been corroborated by many other experiments. Ho et al. 
(1998) show that convergence to the Nash equilibrium is faster when   is farther 
away from 1, groups are larger, and participants are experienced. Duffy and Nagel 
(1997) show that when the target number is based upon the median guess (maximum 
guess) instead of the mean guess, convergence is faster (slower). Nagel’s results 
where also confirmed in three large scale one-shot number guessing games, run 
through newspapers in Germany, Spain and the U.K. and involving thousands of 
participants (Bosch-Domènech et al., 2003). 
All of the experiments discussed above use  0   , implying that the Nash 
equilibrium lies at the boundary of the action space (typically  ). Some authors 
have looked at number guessing games with interior equilibria (
0
*  x
0   ), particularly, 
Camerer and Ho (1998), Güth et al. (2002) and Kocher and Sutter (2006). The last 
two papers also depart from the standard winner-takes-all payoff incentive scheme 







of professionals (Grosskopf and Nagel, 2008). and reward all participants based upon the absolute distance between their guess and 
the target number.
11 Güth et al. (2002) conjecture that, because participants try to 
avoid extreme choices, convergence in games with interior equilibria is faster than in 
games with boundary equilibria. Their experiment confirms this. Moreover, the 
fraction of equilibrium choices in the ‘interior equilibrium’ game is significantly 
higher than in the ‘boundary equilibrium’ game, which they attribute partly to the 
payoff scheme.
12 
The number guessing game has been used as a vehicle for investigating a 
number of other issues. Weber (2003) shows that participants still learn, albeit at a 
slower rate, if no feedback is given between periods. Kocher et al. (2007) and Sbriglia 
(2008) show that additional information, such as strategies of the winners in earlier 
periods, or strategies from participants in an earlier number guessing game, facilitates 
faster convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Slonim (2005) finds that experienced 
players, when matched with  inexperienced players, win the game more often and 
make choices farther away from the equilibrium. Finally, Kocher and Sutter (2005) 
and Sutter (2005) show that teams of players learn faster than individuals and increase 
convergence speed. 
 
2.2 Positive expectations feedback experiments 
Consider the following textbook asset pricing model (for reviews, see Cuthberson, 
1996, Campbell et al., 1997, and Brock and Hommes, 1998). There are H  traders 
who divide their wealth between two assets. The first asset is risk free, with fixed 
return r R  1 , where   is the interest rate. This asset is in perfect elastic supply 
and its price is normalized to one. The infinitely lived risky asset, with price   in 
periodt, is in fixed aggregate supply   and returns uncertain dividends   in 
periodt, which are independently and identically distributed with mean
0  r
t p
s z t y
y . A trader’s 
demand depends upon his expectation of t t t Rp y p     1 1 , which is the excess return 
of the risky asset. Assuming trader   is a mean-variance maximizer his demand for 
th
h
e risky asset in period t is given by 












Rp y p E
z




  ,        ( 2 )  
where   denotes trader h’s belief about next period excess return 
and V  corresponds to his beliefs about the variance of excess 
returns, which is assumed to be constant over time and the same for all traders. 
Finally,   is a risk aversion parameter (again assumed to be the same for all traders). 
 t t t ht Rp y p E     1 1





In period   aggregate excess demand for the risky asset is given by  t





















p r y p E
z z

 t h     (3) 
In order to close the asset market model we need to specify a model for price 
formation.  
 
Market clearing. Under market clearing the price adjusts in every period in such a 
way that excess demand vanishes. That is, the price   in period t is implicitly 
determined as the solution to
t p
0  t  . Hommes et al. (2005) report on experiments in 
this setting. Letting  y p yt  1 p E
e




t h t y p
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
 1 , 1













1 , 1 ,
1
 is the average price prediction and  t   corresponds to 
(small) stochastic demand and supply shocks. Note that the actual realization of 
today’s price   depends upon people’s belief of tomorrow’s price  . This implies 
that, when having to predict , traders only have information about prices up to 
period  . Intuitively, the reason why investors have to predict two periods ahead is 
that in order to make a profit an investor first has to buy (short sell) an asset in period 
 and after that sell (buy) it in period 
t p 1  t p
1  t p
1  t




f   corresponds to 
the fundamental value of the risky asset (i.e. the discounted value of the stream of 
future dividends). If, on average, traders predict 
f e
t h p p  1 ,  the actual price will, in 
expectation, equal   as well. 
f p
Participants in the experiment by Hommes et al. (2005) are explained that they 
are the advisor of a large investor, e.g. a pension fund. Their task is to predict future 
  7prices in a stock market and their reward depends on their prediction accuracy. They 
are told the investor will take a position in the market that depends on their prediction 
of future prices (see Appendix A for complete instructions) and that there are other 
large investors in the market advised by other participants. They are not told the 
precise formula used to calculate the realized price, but they know the direction of the 
feedback structure (if many participants expect high (low) prices, investors will buy 
(sell) more stocks and the price will increase (decrease)).  The participants receive 
information in each period about previous prices and their own predictions, both in a 
graph and a table.  
For the experiment fourteen groups were investigated, with each group 
consisting of    participants, predicting prices for 51 periods. 6  H
 r
13 Reported 
predictions had to be between 0 and 100 and two decimals could be used. The risk 
free rate of return, , and the mean dividend,  05 . 0 3  y , were fixed such that the 
equilibrium price equals  
60 
f p .








, 0 N , 
was used for all groups. 
Participants could earn 1300 points each period. The number of points earned 














ht t t h p p e ,          ( 5 )  
where 1300 points is equivalent to 0.50 euro. To avoid negative earnings, earnings in 
period  t were zero when 7  
e
ht t p p . This payoff scheme was common knowledge. 
The upper panels of Figure 1 show the prices and predictions in a 
representative group (group 1) from Hommes et al. (2005). Two features are apparent. 
                                                 
05 . 0
13  In some groups robot traders were added. These robot traders always predicted the fundamental 
price and make a trading decision based upon this prediction. The impact of robot traders in these 
markets is endogenous:  the greater the distance between the actual price and the fundamental price the 
more these fundamental traders will invest, and the other way around. They therefore act as a 
‘stabilizing force’ pushing prices in the direction of the fundamental price. Behavior in markets with 
robot traders is qualitatively similar to behavior in markets without robot traders (for details see 
mmes et al., 2005).  Ho




 resulting in 
an equilibrium price of  , which (in contrast to the equilibrium price for the other groups) is 
below the midpoint of the interval from which predictions can be chosen. Behavior in these three 
groups is qualitatively the same as the behavior in the other groups (for details see Hommes et al., 
2005). First, the asset price shows persistent and significant deviations from its fundamental 
value (upper left panel). Secondly, the dispersion of individual predictions is 
remarkably small (upper right panel). Participants seem to coordinate on a common 
prediction strategy. Both features are robust: systematic deviations of the price from 









Prices - Market clearing (group 1)





Predictions - Market clearing (group 1)





Prices - Market maker (group 1)





Predictions - Market maker (group 1)
 
Figure 1: Upper panels show prices (left) and predictions (right) from group 1 in 
Hommes et al. (2005a), lower panels show prices (left) and predictions (right) from 
group 1 in Heemeijer et al. (2009). 
 
Market maker. An alternative model of price formation is one where prices are set 
by a market maker. In that scenario traders report their demands (2) to a market maker 
who, like the well-known Walrasian auctioneer, aggregates excess demands and 
increases (decreases) the price of the risky asset when  there is excess demand 
(supply) for the risky asset (see e.g. Beja and Goldman, 1980). That is, prices change 
according to 
                                                 
15   Hommes et al. (2008) discuss experiments without robot traders and without an upper limit  for 
price predictions. Coordination of expectations persists in that framework, together with even more 
severe bubbles and crashes. Bottazzi and Devetag (2005) and Bottazzi et al. (2009) study a variant 
where participants give a confidence interval for the realized price, instead of a point prediction, and 
where they are rewarded on the basis of the increase in wealth their predictions generate. In this setting 
the incidence of bubbles decreases and heterogeneity of predictions increases. 
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 .   (6) 
Here  0    is a parameter that measures the speed of adjustment. 
Heemeijer et al. (2009) reports on experiments with 7 groups of  
participants each, predicting prices for 50 periods. Parameter values are fixed such 
that , , , 
6  H
05 . 0  r 6   a
2 s 1  z
21
20
  and   
s
















, 0 N  is a random term, representing e.g. small random fluctuations in 
the supply of the risky asset. The equilibrium price is . No upper limit on the 
price predictions was enforced (with the exception of the first period, which had to be 
between 0 and 100). As before, payoffs were based upon the quadratic forecasting 
error function (5) and the exchange rate was 2600 points for 1 euro.  
60 
f p
The lower panels of Figure 1 show the prices and predictions in a 
representative group (group 1) from Heemeijer et al. (2009). As in the market clearing 
experiment there is no apparent convergence to the fundamental steady state although 
fluctuations around the steady state appear to have a lower frequency. Moreover, 
again participants seem to coordinate their prediction strategies quite well. The other 
six groups show a similar pattern. 
  The main features of the positive expectations feedback experiments, 
systematic deviation of prices from fundamentals and coordination of predictions, 
therefore seem to be quite robust (see e.g. Leitner and Schmidt, 2007, for similar 
results in an exchange rate experiments). 
 
2.3 A comparison of number guessing games and positive expectations feedback 
experiments 
The asset pricing experiment from Heemeijer et al. (2009) is closely related to 
the standard formulation of the number guessing game. In fact, the price generating 
mechanism (7) is a special case of (1) with 
21
60
   and
21
20
   . The results from the 
two types of experiments are quite different however. In number guessing game 
  10experiments choices typically convergence to the steady state within a small number 
of periods, whereas prices and predictions in positive expectations feedback 
experiments keep on fluctuating, as is obvious from Figure 1. Both findings seem to 
be robust. 
There are several differences in the designs of the two types of experiments 
that may be responsible for these qualitative differences. Three important differences 
in design are listed below. 
 
Structure: First, in standard number guessing games (where  0   ) typically the 
Nash equilibrium is on the boundary of the action space ( ), whereas positive 
expectations feedback experiments (where 
0 
* x
0   ) typically have an interior 
equilibrium with a strictly positive price for the risky asset,  . Obviously, 
oscillations around a boundary equilibrium are by construction impossible. On the 
other hand, Güth et al. (2002) argue that an interior equilibrium in a number guessing 
game leads to faster convergence. An explanation for this may be that in case of an 
equilibrium value at the boundary convergence is only possible with coordination of 
choices (all players choose the equilibrium number) while uncoordinated choices 
scattered around an internal equilibrium can still lead to an equilibrium outcome. A 
second structural difference is that the feedback strength parameter 
0 
f p
  is much 
smaller in most number guessing games (typically, 
3
2
  ) as compared to the 
positive expectations feedback experiments discussed above (where 95 . 0
21
20
   ). 
The highest feedback strength value in number guessing games that we know of 
(abstracting from values of   larger than 1) is  9 . 0    in Ho et al. (1998), which 
nevertheless leads to results that are qualitatively similar to other number guessing 
game experiments. Finally, in asset pricing experiments a small stochastic parameter 
t   is added in every period. Apart from these differences in structure also the fact that 
the number of repetitions in the guessing game is much smaller (typically 4-10) than 
the number of repetitions in expectation feedback experiments may contribute to some 
of the differences. 
 
  11Information: In number guessing game experiments the game that is being played is 
common knowledge. Moreover, participants know the number of other players and 
typically even receive feedback, in each round, about the chosen numbers of these 
other participants. In expectations feedback experiments, on the other hand, 
participants only have qualitative information about the underlying game. They do not 
have information about the number of other players in the game, nor do they see the 
price predictions of these other players. The reason for not providing the participants 
with the price formation formula is that this remains closer to the reality of real world 
markets: traders typically do not know how other traders’ trading decisions are related 
to their expectations. Also, the information in expectations feedback experiments has 
an economic frame, whereas in guessing games the problem is posed as an abstract 
game, without any reference to investment decisions, stock prices or financial 
markets. In general, one could argue that the level of complexity of the presentation of 
expectations feedback experiments is higher than that of the guessing game, which is 
relatively straightforward. This higher level of complexity might be a possible 
explanation of the difference in results for these two types of experiments. 
 
Incentives: Guessing games use a winner-takes-all tournament structure, whereas 
expectations feedback experiments reward on the basis of prediction accuracy. The 
latter incentive structure is also based upon real life: a stock market is typically not a 
winner-takes-all situation. The only number guessing game experiments departing 
from the tournament structure are Güth et al. (2002), Kocher and Sutter (2006) and 
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006). The former suggest that the large fraction of 
equilibrium choices in their experiment is due to what they call the “continuous 
payment scheme”. Moreover, Kocher and Sutter (2006) suggest that the winner-takes-
all scheme might lead single players to retire mentally, or to start experimenting. On 
the other hand: one could argue that a tournament structure forces participants not 
only to predict accurately, but to predict better than others. This may inhibit 
satisficing behavior and force participants to think harder about the game and make 
prices converge faster. 
 
In the next section we will discuss and analyze a new set of experiments to test to 
which of these differences in design (structure, information or incentives) the 
  12  13
differences in results between number guessing games and asset pricing experiments 
can be attributed. 
 
3. Bridging the gap: Design of new experiments 
In this section we report on three new expectations feedback studies in which 
parameters and experimental design are varied in an attempt to bridge the gap 
between number guessing games and positive expectations feedback experiments. 
Table 1 gives an overview.  
Our approach is the following. Starting with the experiment from Heemeijer et 
al. (2009), henceforth referred to as experiment MM, we change in each new 
experiment
16 one design parameter in the direction of the typical number guessing 
game solution, in order to find the design parameter that is responsible for the 
difference in outcomes between number guessing games and positive expectations 
feedback experiments. All other elements of the design (procedures, instructions, etc) 
are held constant. The subject pool consists of undergraduate students from the 
University of Amsterdam, typically from economics, psychology and chemistry. 
Earnings for participants in the winner-takes-all experiments TN, TI, LTN and LTI 
are, by construction, 25 euro on average (in each group of 6 participants there was a 
prize of 3 euro in each of the 50 periods) and range from a minimum of 9 euro to a 
maximum of 52 euro. Earnings in the experiments MM and LQ ranged from 19.53 to 
24.72 euro, with a mean of 23.46, earnings in the (older and more complex) MC 
experiment ranged from 8.64 to 24.86 euro and were 21.46 euro on average 
Furthermore, all participants received a show-up fee of 5 euro. See appendix A for the 
procedures, a screenshot and the instructions. 

















Tournament  Complete  Boundary (0)  0.67    Fast convergence to 
fundamental value 




Quadratic error Limited  Interior  0.95  14x6 Fast  coordination, 
no/slow convergence to 
fundamental 




Quadratic error  Limited  Interior  0.95  7x6  Fast coordination, 
no/slow convergence to 
fundamental 
TN  Market 
maker 
Tournament  Limited Interior  0.95  6x6 Fast  coordination, 
no/slow convergence to 
fundamental, spoilers 
TI  Market 
maker 
Tournament  Complete  Interior 0.95  6x6  Fast  coordination, 
no/slow convergence to 
fundamental, spoilers 
LTN  Market 
maker 
Tournament  Limited  Interior  0.67  6x6  Fast convergence to 
fundamental value, 
spoilers 
LTI  Market 
maker 
Tournament  Complete  Interior 0.67  6x6  Fast convergence to 
fundamental value, 
spoilers 
LQ  Market 
maker 
Quadratic error Complete  Interior  0.67  6x6  Fast convergence to 
fundamental value 
Table 1: Properties of the traditional number guessing game and the studies reported in the present paper. The last five rows are new 
experiments run for this article. Bold entries refer to dimensions in the design that have changed in relation to the previous experiment.  4. Results 
This section first discusses the results of the three new expectation feedback 
experiments one by one. After that the results of these and previous experiments are 
compared on the aspects convergence, prediction accuracy and coordination of 
expectations. Furthermore, the occurrence of spoilers is analyzed. 
 
4.1 Incentives: Winner-takes-all instead of quadratic error payoffs 
The pay-off function used in the first two studies is based on the quadratic forecasting 
error and is rather flat at the optimum; small errors are barely punished. Less precision 
in forecasting can have large consequences in a tournament if the best competitor 
makes forecasting errors of a comparable size. Tournament incentives can thus 
motivate participants to be more precise. On the other hand, it may demotivate those 
participants whose predictions are of a lower quality and who do not expect to win 
anyhow. 
In experiment TN a tournament incentive structure (like the one typically used 
in guessing games) is used: in each period the participant with the smallest forecasting 
error receives a prize of 3 euro (in case of two or more winners the prize is split 
evenly). All other aspects of the design are the same as in Heemeijer et al. (2009), 
except that predictions of more than 1000 were not accepted by the computer 
program. We run 6 groups with  6  H  participants predicting prices for 50 periods. 
Figure 2 shows predictions and prices for all periods and all groups. Recall 
that the equilibrium price corresponds to . The time series of predictions and 
prices has three important features. First, on several occasions one of the participants 
submits a very high price prediction. This is particularly evident in groups 1, 2 and 3. 
In groups 1 and 2 predictions of 999 are submitted, in group 3 a prediction of 999.9 is 
submitted and in groups 2 and 3 predictions of 1000 are submitted.  
60
*  p
Also in the other three groups there are occasionally rather uncommon 
predictions. Obviously, these so-called “spoilers” destabilize the dynamics and inhibit 
convergence to the equilibrium price.
17 We will analyze these spoilers in more depth 
in Section 4.4.4. The second feature is that there is no apparent or fast convergence to 
the equilibrium price. The third feature corresponds to the high degree of coordination 
  15
                                                 
17 This terminology is due to Ho et al. (1998) who also find a subtantial number of these spoilers 
in their guessing game experiment. The occurrence of these spoilers seems to be typical for 
winner‐takes‐all incentives.   of predictions (in the absence of spoilers). These two last features can be easily 
checked by inspection of the graphs for groups 4, 5 and 6, but they also hold for those 
periods in groups 1, 2 and 3 before the first spoiler has occurred.  
Summarizing, introduction of winner-takes-all incentives leads to an increase 
in “spoilers”, but it does not appear to have a significant influence on convergence 
and coordination. 
 
4.2 Information: Complete instead of limited information 
In the expectations feedback experiments discussed so far the explicit price 
function was not available for the participants. In the typical number guessing game, 
however, players know exactly how the target number is calculated from the reported 
numbers. We decided to run two sessions (six groups) in which the price function was 
given and explained to the participants. As in the TN experiment participants were 
rewarded on a winner-takes-all basis. Figure 3 shows the results.  
Compared to the TN experiment the number of “spoilers” seems to be even 
higher. In particular, predictions of 999 or 1000 were submitted in four of the six 
groups, resulting in an overall decrease in the rate of convergence. For groups 2 and 3, 
however, it is obvious that there is little convergence, even in the absence of spoilers. 
The “pre-spoiler” predictions in groups 4, 5 and 6 also don't show a fast convergence.  
Even with a winner-take-all payment structure and complete information about 
the price generating mechanism the dynamics are characterized by persistent 
deviations from the fundamental price and coordination of individual predictions. 
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Figure 2: Prices (solid line), predictions (gray line) and equilibrium price (dotted line) in 6 
groups with tournament incentives and limited information. In the first 3 groups the graph 
is split in two and rescaled: the periods before a participant submitted a very high 
prediction leading to a realized price higher than 100, and afterwards. For clarity the 
equilibrium price is not displayed in the rescaled parts of the figure. 
 
 
  174.3 Feedback strength 
The remaining three experiments we ran, referred to as experiment LTN, LTI 
and LQ, respectively, considered a change in the feedback strength.
 18 In particular, 
the price generating mechanism for each of these experiments was given by: 





t t p p      (8) 
Note that equation (8) follows from (6) by taking parameter values , , 
, 
5 . 0  r 6





  and   for all hand t. Also observe that (8) requires a 
substantial interest rate of 50%. The slope of (8) equals 

s
t t h z y E   30 ,
3
2
 which corresponds to the 
typical value used in number guessing game experiments. 
In experiments LTN and LTI participants are rewarded based upon winner-
takes-all incentives, and in experiment LQ participants are rewarded based upon 
quadratic forecasting error. Furthermore, in experiments LTI and LQ the price 
function (8) was common knowledge (as in experiment TI), whereas in experiment 
LTN it was not (as in experiments MM and TN). As before an upper limit of 1000 to 
the prediction was imposed after period 1. 
Ho et al. (1998) provide an indication that a less steep slope could enhance 
convergence. They report that a higher factor (0.9 instead of 0.7) in a standard number 
guessing game with 7 participants causes mean choices to be farther from the 
equilibrium value 0. Their Figures 2A and 2C suggest that the difference is largest in 
the first 5 periods. It is not clear in advance whether their results will also hold in the 
interior equilibrium case. 
  Figures 4-6 shows the results for our experiments LTN, LTI and LQ, 
respectively. For each experiment all six groups converge very fast to the equilibrium. 
Moreover, in the winner-takes-all experiments LTN and LTI there are a substantial 
number of spoilers, whereas in experiment LQ the number of spoilers is rather 
limited. 
                                                 
  18
18  Originally we only ran experiment LQ. A referee and an associate editor urged us to also run 
experiments LTN and LTI, in particular since the feedback strength plays a crucial role in the 
convergence results. We are thankful for this suggestion and believe the results are more robust with 
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Figure 3: Prices (solid line), predictions (gray line) and equilibrium price (dotted line) in 6 
groups with tournament incentives and full information. For groups 4, 5 and 6 the graph is 
split in two and rescaled: the periods before a participant submitted a very high prediction 
leading to a realized price higher than 100, and afterwards. In group 1 a prediction of 1000 
was submitted already in period 3. For clarity the equilibrium price is not displayed in the 
rescaled parts of the figure. 
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Figure 4: Prices (solid line), predictions (gray line) and equilibrium price (dotted line) in 6 
groups with tournament incentives and limited information (LTN). For groups 3 and 4 the 
graph is split in two and rescaled: the periods before a participant submitted a very high 
prediction leading to a realized price higher than 100, and afterwards. For clarity the 
equilibrium price is not displayed in the rescaled parts of the figure. 
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Figure 5: Prices (solid line), predictions (gray line) and equilibrium price (dotted line) in 6 
groups with tournament incentives and full information (LTI). For groups 1, 2 and 5 the 
graph is split in two and rescaled: the periods before a participant submitted a very high 
prediction leading to a realized price higher than 100, and afterwards. For clarity the 
equilibrium price is not displayed in the rescaled parts of the figure. 
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Figure 6: Prices (solid line), predictions (gray line) and equilibrium price (dotted line) in 6 
groups with quadratic error incentives and low feedback strength (LQ). For group 5 the 
graph is split in two and rescaled: the periods before a participant submitted a very high 
prediction leading to a higher price than 100, and afterwards.  
 
  224.4 Comparison of the experimental results 
The results described above suggest that providing more information to 
participants or changing to a ‘winner-takes-all’ incentive structure does not change the 
convergence and coordination properties of the positive expectations feedback 
experiments, but that a decrease in feedback strength is an important determinant for 
convergence. In this section we will try to provide some additional evidence to 
substantiate that claim. Moreover, in Section 4.4.4 we will analyze the increased 
incidence of spoilers in the ‘winner-takes-all’ experiments. 
We are not using all available data for the analysis in this section. Obviously, a 
period in which one participant submits a spoiler leads to a large divergence from the 
equilibrium price for all predictions in that group in that period, but often there is also 
an effect in the following periods: the general price level increases leading to larger 
absolute prediction errors and a large absolute distance from the equilibrium price. 
Therefore, for each experimental group, we have only included those observations 
from periods before the first spoiler is submitted. In order to do this we need to 
specify which prediction outliers can be classified as a “spoiler”. Our working 
definition of a spoiler is twofold. First the prediction of the participant has to be 
substantially different from the predictions of the other participants, and second, the 
spoiler should occur in a relatively stable market. Therefore we require the spoiler to 
be more than 50% larger or smaller than the median of the other five predictions in 
that group in that period, and we require that the relative change in realized prices in 
the two most recent periods is smaller than 10%. This definition captures most of the 
outliers that can be seen in Figures 2-6, with some exceptions.
19  Alternative 
procedures yield similar qualitative results. Table 7 in Appendix B gives a precise 
description of the data we used. Since the number of spoilers in experiments with a 
tournament structure is substantial the number of periods with a positive number of 
observations is equal to 36. 
  23
























































































































































































Figure 7: Measures of convergence, prediction accuracy and coordination, aggregated in 
three different ways (tournament (+) versus quadratic scoring (-), complete (+) versus 
limited information (-), high (+) versus low (-) feedback strength). 
 
 
4.4.1 Convergence  
Figures 1-6 suggest that convergence only occurs in the low feedback experiments 
LTN, LTI and LQ. In this section we measure convergence by computing, for each of 
the seven experiments, the median 
f e
t h p p  ,  over all participants in the experiment 
of the absolute distance between the individual prediction and the equilibrium price 
for every period. The top row panels of Figure 7 show these medians, averaged in 
three different ways. The top left panel compares the average over all tournament 
experiments (TN, TI, LTN and LTI indicated by +) with the experiments using a 
quadratic scoring rule (MC, MM and LQ, indicated by -), the top middle panel 
compares the average over all experiments with complete information (TI, LTI and 
LQ, indicated by +) with those with limited information (MC, MM, TN and LTN, 
indicated by -) and the top right panel compares the average over experiments with 
  24low feedback strength (LTN, LTI and LQ, indicated by +) with those with high 
feedback strength (MC, MM, TN and TI, indicated by -).  These three panels confirm 
our conjecture that it is the value of the feedback strength that is critical for 
convergence. In addition, Figure 8 top panel shows, for each experiment, the mean 
rank and confidence intervals of the convergence measure (using time periods 6 to 36, 
to allow for an initial learning phase). Clearly two subsets of experiments can be 
distinguished: the first consisting of the first four experiments (MC, MM, TN and TI), 
and the second consisting of the last three experiments (LTN, LTI and LQ), where the 
measure for convergence for the experiments from the first subset ranks clearly 




4.4.2 Prediction accuracy 
The middle row of Figure 7 shows, for each period, the median over all participants of 
the absolute value of the individual prediction error  t
e
t h p p  , , as before aggregated in 
three different ways (tournament vs. quadratic scoring, complete vs. limited 
information and high vs. low feedback strength), using the same data as above. None 
of the three treatment variables seem to have an impact on prediction accuracy. This is 
corroborated by Figure 8 middle panel, which shows the mean rank and confidence 
intervals of this measure of prediction accuracy for the seven different experiments. 
Accuracy is significantly worse in experiment MC (Friedman test, p-value of 0.0000), 
reflecting the difficulty of predicting two periods ahead. There is no significant 
difference between the other six experiments (Friedman test, p-value of 0.3970). 
Therefore, there is no evidence that either tournament incentives, information or 
feedback strength increase prediction accuracy. 
                                                 
  25
20  The Friedman test rejects the hypothesis that all experiments are the same (p-value of 0.0000). It 
also rejects that the high feedback strength experiments are the same (p-value of 0.0012)  and that the 
low feedback strength experiments are the same (p-value of 0.027). However, experiments MC, TN 
and TI are not significantly different from each other (p-value of 0.1590). Moreover, experiment LQ is 
not significantly different from experiment LTN (p-value of 0.2086) and not significantly different 
from experiment LTI (p‐value of 0.8575), although LTN and LTI are clearly significantly different 
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Figure 8: The mean rank and confidence intervals of the convergence measure, prediction 
accuracy measure and the coordination measure for the different experiments (with, from 
top to bottom, experiments MC, MM, TN, TI, LTN, LTI and LQ, respectively).  
 
 
4.4.3 Coordination of expectations 
Coordination of expectations is measured by looking at the median (over groups) of 
the standard deviation of predictions for each period. A low value of this standard 
deviation implies a high level of coordination of predictions. The bottom row of 
Figure 7 shows this measure, aggregated in three different ways again, reflecting the 
effect of incentives, information and feedback strength, respectively. None of the 
  26treatments seems to result in a structural difference in terms of coordination.
21 Figure 
8 lower panel shows the mean rank and confidence intervals for the convergence 




For each experiment we classified the participants and periods that correspond to 
spoilers, according to the definition given in the beginning of this section. Detailed 
information about the spoilers can be found in Appendix B. It is obvious that in the 
winner-takes-all experiments TN, TI, LTN and LTI more participants submit spoilers 
and spoilers are submitted in more periods. In particular, 40 participants in these 
experiments (corresponding to 28% of the participants in these experiments) were 
responsible for submitting a total of 92 spoilers (corresponding to a percentage of 
1.3% of the total number of choices in those experiments, consequently in 7.8% of the 
periods at least one participant submitted a spoiler).
23 In the quadratic forecast error 
experiments MC, MM and LQ the percentage of participants submitting spoilers is 
6.2%, submitting spoilers in 0.15% of the total number of choices in those 
experiments, or in 0.9% of the periods. The winner-takes-all payoff scheme therefore 
seems to have a substantial effect on the incidence of spoilers.
24 
By construction, the average payoff of a participant in experiments TN and TI 
is 25 euro (50 rounds x 3 euro / 6 participants). The average total earnings of 
participants that submit spoilers at least once in experiments TN, TI, LTN and LTI is 
96%, 91%, 93% and 98% of 25 euro, respectively, which is not significantly different 
at a 5% level (the p-values from a t-test are 0.6024, 0.1857, 0.7523 and 0.8261, 
                                                 
21  There are some outliers, whic   h are due to large dispersion in predictions that are not 
characterized as spoilers (see footnote 19). 
















actual behavior on financial markets.   respectively), implying that they do not structurally perform better or worse than the 
other participants. 
There might be several reasons why participants submit these spoilers. 
Participants may, for example, be frustrated with their earnings thus far, and/or they 
may want to increase the probability of winning in period t by disrupting the price 
dynamics in period . Each period 3 euro is won by one of the participants in a 
group thus on average participants earn 3/6 = 0.50 euro per period. The average 
earnings per period for “spoiling” participants before their first spoiler equal 43 cents 
in TN, 42 cents in TI, 44 cents in LTN and 38 cents in LTI, which is not significantly 
lower than the expected earnings per period.
 
1  t
25  Moreover, the median number of 
periods before their first “spoiler” that a spoiling participant did not earn anything is 
equal to 4 for the TN experiment, equal to 5 for the TI and LTN experiments and 
equal to 3 for the LTI experiment,  (notice that on average each participants should 
earn something (at least) every 6 periods). Although for some individual cases it 
seems likely that frustration plays a role (e.g. participants 2, 3 and 4 in group 2 of 
experiment TN did not earn anything in the 17, 14 and 14 periods prior to submitting 
their first spoiler, respectively), there is no clear evidence to suggest that ‘frustration’ 
is the main driving force behind the increased number of spoilers in the experiments 
with tournament structure.  
Finally, spoilers did not prove to be exceptionally profitable: 18 of the 92 
spoilers in experiment TN, TI, LTN and LTI led to positive payoffs in the next period, 
which is consistent with what one would expect,
26 although some participants were 
indeed very successful with their spoilers (e.g. participants 5 and 6 in group 2 of 
experiment LTN who both won two out of three times immediately after they 
submitted a spoiler). For 24 participants in these experiments relative earnings after 
spoiling were higher than before, and for 15 they were lower.
27 
Summarizing, we did not find a unique convincing explanation for the 
occurrence of spoilers in our tournament experiments. Note however that the expected 
opportunity costs for submitting a spoiler are only 50 eurocents, and it might not be 









sided sign test, p‐value of 0.0998).  surprising that some subjects cannot resist submitting these spoilers in some of the 50 
periods of the experiment.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In our earlier papers on (positive) expectations feedback experiments we found very 
slow or no convergence to the equilibrium price. Number guessing games are very 
much related to expectations feedback experiments but typically show fast 
convergence to the Nash equilibrium. This striking discrepancy was the reason for 
designing five additional experiments where we searched for the driving force behind 
this difference. We found that expectation feedback games are robust to changes in 
the incentive structure and changes in the information provided to the participants. We 
consider this robustness to be good news. On the other hand, the low feedback 
strength experiments LTN, LTI and LQ show that presenting the number guessing 
game in the context of a financial market, with an interior Nash equilibrium results in 
very fast convergence like in the traditional number guessing game. 
Since both prediction accuracy and coordination of expectations appear to be 
independent of the feedback strength, prediction behavior of participants in the low 
feedback strength experiments is not substantially different from prediction behavior 
of participants in the high feedback strength experiments. Instead, the convergence 
properties seem to be mainly due to the structure of the price generating mechanism 
itself. To see this, consider  equations (7) and (8) again. Both price generating 
mechanisms give the realized price as a weighted average between the mean predicted 
price and the fundamental value of 60. However, the weight on the fundamental value 
in equation (7) is only 1/21, whereas in equation (8) it is 1/3. As an illustration, if the 
mean prediction equals 50, a high feedback strength experiment would give an 
expected realized price of 50.48, whereas the low feedback strength experiment would 
give a price of 53.33. Clearly, prices in the low feedback strength experiments are 
therefore more strongly pushed towards the fundamental price and this explains the 
stronger convergence in those experiments. This is confirmed by simulations with the 
so-called heuristic switching model that was developed in Anufriev and Hommes 
(2010). In their model they assume that participants switch between four typical 
prediction heuristics on the basis of past prediction accuracy of these heuristics. This 
model is quite succesful in explaining the results from the MC experiment.  
  29Simulations of this model with the same heuristics and parameter specification but 
with a feedback strength of 2/3 leads to quick convergence of prices and predictions.  
Let us now consider again the original beauty contest game as described by 
Keynes (see introduction) and compare this with the number guessing game. In the 
beauty contest game the task is to choose the pictures that are most often chosen by 
others; this is comparable with the number guessing game with   0 and 1. In 
the beauty contest game there are many equilibria where all participants choose the 
same pictures and therefore the game in essence corresponds to a coordination 
problem. When  1 players who have higher order beliefs on different levels can 
still make the same decision. A number guessing game with  1(and not too close 
to 1 in order to be able to differentiate between different levels) is a good tool to study 
higher order beliefs in experiments but it is not necessarily a good behavioral model 
of an asset market. A   that is much smaller than one corresponds to an enormous 
interest rate in a financial context (e.g. 50% in the experiment with low feedback 
strength) and a price that is mainly driven by dividends. A   close to 1 corresponds 
to a more realistic interest rate and investors/speculators who focus on capital gains 
rather than on dividends. This seems to be more in line with modern financial 
markets. The stylized facts about excess volatility in modern markets also point in that 
direction.
28 Another possible objection to an interpretation of the number guessing 
game as a model of financial markets is that an asset market is clearly not a 
tournament where the winner takes all. However, the incentive scheme appears not to 
be crucial for the number guessing game: in the low feedback strength experiments 
we find about the same results as in standard number guessing games with a 
tournament structure. 
Concluding, we find that the   in the number guessing game is the essential 
design parameter: a   much smaller than 1 makes it possible to study higher order 
beliefs but the game is in that case not a realistic model of a modern asset market. A 
  closer to 1 makes a more realistic behavioral asset market model, but at the same 
                                                 
  30
28  Our results are related to those of Hirota and Sunder (2007) who present an asset market experiment 
with two treatments. In the long-horizon treatment participants are in the market until the asset matures 
and prices indeed converge to fundamental values and are mainly determined by dividends, just as in 
the guessing games experiment. In the short-horizon treatment, on the other hand, participants leave the 
experiment before the asset has matured and prices typically do not converge to their fundamental 
value. In the latter case dividend payments play a minor role in the determination of asset prices, just as 
in our expectations feedback experiments. time makes it harder or impossible to distinguish different levels of higher order 
beliefs. The next question is whether Keynes was right in his proposition that higher 
order beliefs are an important element of asset markets. Maybe it is for some 
investors, but browsing internet forums suggests that many investors/speculators view 
the market like a living organism which movements you try to predict and not as a 
game in which you try to form beliefs about the beliefs of others. This interesting 
question can not be answered here but is a topic for future research. 
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Procedure and instructions 
We present the procedure and a translation of the instructions for experiment MM (the 
instructions in experiment MC differ only in some phrasing). Boxes are included 
where the instructions are different in the other studies. 
 
Procedure 
A short welcoming message was read aloud from paper, after which the participants 
were randomly assigned to a cubicle in the computer lab. In each cubicle there was a 
computer, some experimental instructions on paper and some blank paper with a pen. 
The two experiments had different instructions. When all the participants were seated, 
they were asked to read the instructions on their desks. After a few minutes, they were 
given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the instructions, after which the 
experiment started. When the 50 time periods were completed, the participants were 
asked to remain seated and fill in the questionnaire, which was subsequently handed 
out to them. After a reasonable amount of time, the participants were called to the 
ante-room one by one to hand in the questionnaire and receive their earnings, in cash. 
The participants left the computer lab after receiving their earnings. 
The experimental instructions the participants read in their cubicles consisted of 
three parts, totalling five pages. The first part contained general information about the 
market the experiment was about to simulate. The second part contained an 
explanation of the computer program used during the experiment. The third part 
displayed a table relating the absolute prediction error made in any single period to 
the amount of credits earned in that period. The conversion rate between credits and 
euros, being 2600 credits to 1 euro. (In experiments TN and TI a tournament was 
implemented and the tabel was omitted).  
 
Experimental instructions 
The shape of the artificial market used by the experiment, and the role you will have 
in it, will be explained in the text below. Read these instructions carefully. They 
continue on the backside of this sheet of paper. 
General information 
You are an advisor of a trader who is active on a market for a certain product. In each 
time period the trader needs to decide how many units of the product he will buy, 
intending to sell them again the next period. To take an optimal decision, the trader 
requires a good prediction of the market price in the next time period. As the advisor 
of the trader you will predict the price P(t) of the product during 50 successive time 
periods. Your earnings during the experiment will depend on the accuracy of your 
predictions. The smaller your prediction errors, the greater your earnings. 
About the market 
The price of the product will be determined by the law of supply and demand. Supply 
and demand on the market are determined by the traders of the product. Higher price 
predictions make a trader demand a higher quantity. A high price prediction makes 
the trader willing to buy the product, a low price prediction makes him willing to sell 
it. There are several large traders active on this market and each of them is advised by 
a participant of this experiment. Total supply is largely determined by the sum of the 
individual supplies and demands of these traders. Besides the large traders, a number 
of small traders is active on the market, creating small fluctuations in total supply and 
demand. 
  35About the price 
The price is determined as follows. If total demand is larger than total supply, the 
price will rise. Conversely, of total supply is larger than total demand, the price will 
fall. 
 
About the price experiments TI and LOW 
The price in each period depends upon your prediction and the prediction of the other 
5 participants. Let   be the average prediction in period t, than:  ) (t GV
) ( 95 . 0 85 . 2 ) ( t GV t price     (experiment TI) (1) 
) ( 3 / 2 20 ) ( t GV t price      (experiment LOW) (1) 
This is the price when only the large traders (who are advised by the six particpants) 
would be influencing the price. The small traders on the market cause a small change 
of the price, sometimes negative, sometimes positive and on average zero. We will 
indicate this amount in period t by   and it will be almost always between -1 and 1.  ) (t k
The value of  is not related to this value in other periods. The realized price in  ) (t k
period t will be: 
) ( ) ( ) ( t k t price t P   . (2) 
We will give and example. The predictions of the 6 participants in period 1 are 14, 80, 
76, 30, 57 and 23. The average prediction is: 
  67 . 46
6
23 57 30 76 80 14
) 1 ( 
    
 GV  
and this gives the price:  
30 . 47 67 . 46 95 . 0 85 . 2 ) 1 (     price  (experiment TI) 
11 . 51 67 . 46 3 / 2 20 ) 1 (     price    (experiment LOW) 
The influence of the small traders in this first period   equals 0.13 and the realized  ) 1 ( k
price will be:  
P(1) = 47.30 + 0.13 = 47.43 (experiment TI) 
P(1) = 51.11 + 0.13 = 51.24 (experiment LOW) 
This example and the formulas (1) and (2) show that the realized price will be near the 
average predicted price; if the average predicted price (GV) is low, than the realized 
(P) will be low and if GV is high, P will be high.  
 
About predicting the price 
The only task of the advisors in this experiment is to predict the market price P(t) in 
each time period as accurately as possible. The price (and your prediction) can never 
become negative and lies always between 0 and 100 euros in the first period. The 
price and the prediction in period 2 through 50 is only required to be positive. The 
price will be predicted one period ahead. At the beginning of the experiment you are 
asked to give a prediction for period 1, V(1). When all participants have submitted 
their predictions for the first period, the market price P(1) for this period will be made 
public. Based on the prediction error in period 1, P(1) - V(1), your earnings in the first 
period will be calculated. Subsequently, you are asked to enter your prediction for 
period 2, V(2). When all participants have submitted their prediction for the second 
period, the market price for that period, P(2), will be made public and your earnings 
will be calculated, and so on, for 50 consecutive periods. The information you have to 
form a prediction at period t consists of: All market prices up to time period t-1: {P(t-
1), P(t-2), ..., P(1)}; All your predictions up until time period t-1: {V(t-1), V(t-2), ..., 
V(1)}; Your total earnings at time period t-1. 
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Your earnings depend only on the accuracy of your predictions. The better you predict 
the price in each period, the higher will be your total earnings. On your desk is a table 
listing your earnings for all possible prediction errors. 
For example, your prediction was 13.42. The true market price turned out to be 
12.13. This means that the prediction error is: 13.42 – 12.13 ≈ 1.30. The table then 
says your earnings are 1255 credits (as listed in the second column).  
About the earnings experiments TN and TI 
All participants start with 5 euros and whether they will earn more will depend on the 
quality of their predictions. In every period the participant in your group with the 
smallest prediction error wins 3 euro and the others earn nothing. If more than one 
participant have the smallest error, the prize is split. For example, if the realized price 
is 34.1 and two participants predicted 31.9 and one 36.3 (and the other predictions are 
less accurate), all three have made a prediction error of 2.2 and the earn 3/3=1 euro 
each, and the other participants in the group earn nothing. 
When you are done reading the experimental instructions, you may continue 
reading the computer instructions, which have been placed on your desk as well. 
 
Computer instructions 
The way the computer program works that will be used in the experiment, is 
explained in the text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the 
backside of this sheet of paper. 
The mouse does not work in this program. To enter your prediction you can use 
the numbers, the decimal point and, if necessary, the backspace key on the keyboard.  
Your prediction can have two decimal numbers, for example 30.75. Pay attention 
not to enter a comma instead of a point. Never use the comma. Press enter if you have 
made your choice. 
The available information for predicting the price of the product in period t 
consists of: All product prices from the past up to period t-1; Your predictions up to 
period t-1; Your earnings until then. 
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“prijs” = price; “voorspelling” = prediction; “werkelijke prijs” = market price; 
“ronde” = round; “totale verdiensten” = total earnings; “verdiensten deze periode” = 
earnings this period; “Wat is uw voorspelling voor de volgende periode?” = What is 
your prediction for the next period?; “Een nieuwe ronde is begonnen” = A new round 
has started. 
 
The computer screen. The instructions below refer to this figure. 
In the upper left corner a graph will be displayed consisting of your predictions 
and of the true prices in each period. This graph will be updated at the end of each 
period.  
In the rectangle in the middle left you will see information about the number of 
credits you have earned in the last period and the number you have earned in total. 
The time period is also displayed here, possibly along with other relevant information. 
On the right hand side of the screen the experimental results will be displayed, that 
is, your predictions and the true prices for at most the last 20 periods. 
At the moment of submitting your price prediction, the rectangle in the lower left 
side of the figure will appear. When all participants have subsequently submitted their 
predictions, the results for the next period will be calculated. 
When everyone is ready reading the instructions, we will begin the experiment. If 
you have questions now or during the experiment, raise your hand. Someone will 
come to you for assistance. 
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The definition of spoilers we use is the following. A prediction of a participant in a 
certain period is a spoiler if: i) the prediction is at least 50% higher or lower than the 
median prediction of the other five participants in that group for that period ; and ii) 
the last two changes in the realized price are smaller than 10%.   
 
 
Experiment   
Periods  1—15  16—41  42—50      MC 
Groups  1-14  1-12,14 1,2,4-12,14    
Periods  1—7  8—24  25—50      MM 
Groups  1-7  1-4,6,7  1-4,7     
Periods  1—6 7—21 22—37  38—50     TN 
Groups  1-6 1,2,5,6  1,5  5     
Periods  1—2 3—5  6—8  9  10—36    TI 
Groups  1-6 2-6  2-5  3,4  3   
Periods  1—4 5—8  9—13  14—44 45—50    LTN 
Groups  1-6 1-3,5,6  1,2,5,6  1,5,6 1,5   
Periods  1—5 6—7  8—9  10  11—16  17—50 LTI 
Groups  1-6 2-6  2-5  2,4,5 4,5  4 
Periods  1—7 8—25 26—33  34—49 50    LQ 
Groups  1-6 2-6  2-4,6  3,4,6 3,4   
 
Table B1: Data used in the construction of Figures 7—8. Note that each group 
consists of six participants 
 
 
MC #  (periods) 
3-1 1  (42) 
13-3 1  (16) 
2/84 2/4200 
MM  # (first time) 
5-2 1  (8) 
5-4 2  (28,45) 
6-4 1  (15) 
6-6 1  (25) 
4/42 5/2100 
LQ  # (first time) 
1-1 2  (8,32) 
2-6 1  (34) 
5-4 1  (26) 
6-2 1  (50) 
4/36 5/1800 
Table B2: “Spoilers” in experiments MC, MM and LQ. The first column gives the 
identity of the participant (i-j refers to participant j in group i). The second column 
gives the number of spoilers and (between brackets) the periods in which the spoilers 
occurred. Numbers in boldface rows indicate the number of participants/periods out of 
all participants/periods submitting spoilers/ in which a spoiler is submitted. 
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# (periods)  Payoff Payoff before (# no pay) Score 
1-6  2 (38, 45)  1.14  21 – 1.14 (2)  1 /2 
2-2  3 (22, 34, 37)  0.78  3 – 0.29 (17)  1/3 
2-3  1 (47)  0.78  16.5 – 0.72 (14)  1/1 
2-4  1 (26)  1.02  12 – 0.96 (14)  0/1 
2-6  3 (22, 27, 41)  1.38  10.5 – 1.00 (4)  2/3 
3-3  1 (11)  1.20  9 – 1.80 (2)  0/1 
3-6  6 (7, 16, 19, 29, 32, 35)  0.72  3 – 1.00 (1)  0/6 
4-3  1 (45)  0.82  17.5 – 0.80 (4)  0/1 
4-4  4 (7, 17, 24, 40)  1.00  7 – 2.33 (2)  0/4 
6-5  1 (22)  0.78  3 – 0.29 (4)  0/1 
10/36  23/1800  0.96  0.86 (median: 4)  5/23 
 
Table B3: Analysis of “spoilers” in experiment TN. The first two columns as above. 
The third column gives payoffs during the whole experiment relative to expected 
payoffs of 25 euro, the fourth column gives the payoffs before the first spoiler 
absolutely, as well as relative to expected payoffs, and (between brackets) the number 
of periods before the first spoiler in which nothing was earned. The last column gives 
the number of times earnings were strictly positive in the period following a spoiler.  
 
TI  # (periods)  Payoff  Payoff before (# no pay) Score
1-3  1 (3)  0.90  0 – 0.00 (2)  0/1 
1-4  2 (14, 32)  0.90  3 – 0.46 (9)  1/2 
2-2  1 (25)  1.26  15 – 1.25 (9)  0/1 
2-5  1 (9)  1.08  3 – 0.75 (3)  0/1 
3-3  1 (37)  0.80  12.5 – 0.69 (4)  0/1 
4-1  2 (21, 31)  0.84  15 – 1.5 (0)  0/2 
4-2  2 (10, 16)  1.20  12 – 2.67 (0)  0/2 
4-3  1 (47)  0.66  13.5 – 0.29 (16)  1/1 
4-6  2 (31, 40)  0.96  6 – 0.40 (16)  0/2 
5-2  2 (9, 37)  1.24  6 – 1.50 (3)  0/2 
5-6  1 (18)  0.66  3 – 0.35 (6)  0/1 
6-4  2 (6, 27)  0.72  0 – 0.00 (5)  0/2 
6-5  3 (20, 36, 46)  0.66  9 – 0.95 (12)  0/3 
13/36  21/1800  0.91  0.83 (median: 5)  2/21 
Table B4: Analysis of “spoilers” in experiment TI. For explanation see Table B3. 
 
 
LTN #  (periods)  Payoff Payoff  before (# no pay) Score 
2-5  3 (14, 22, 27)  1.32  6 – 0.92 (6)  2/3 
2-6  3 (15, 23, 40)  1.44  4.5 – 0.64 (0)  2/3 
3-2  1 (23)  0.40  4 – 0.36 (12)  0/1 
3-4  5 (9, 16, 36, 43, 49)  0.76  1 – 0.25 (7)  0/5 
4-2  5 (5, 15, 16, 34, 49)  0.36  0 – 0.00 (4)  1/5 
6-6  1 (45)  1.32  30 – 1.36 (1)  0/1 
6/36  18/1800  0.93  0.87 (median: 5)  5/18 
Table B5: Analysis of “spoilers” in experiment LTN. For explanation see Table B3. 
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LTI  # (periods)  Payoff Payoff before (# no pay)  Score 
 
1-4  2 (6, 29)  0.72  0 – 0.00 (5)  0/2 
1-5  2 (15, 25)  0.84  6 – 0.86 (5)  0/2 
2-4  2 (20, 50)  1.18  11.5 – 1.21 (1)  0/2 
2-5  6 (11, 16, 24, 29, 34, 43)  1.60  10.5 – 2.10 (3)  3/6 
3-5  1 (10)  0.96  3 – 0.67 (2)  0/1 
3-6  2 (18, 21)  1.20  6 – 0.71 (2)  1/2 
5-1  1 (17)  0.90  0 – 0.00 (16)  0/1 
5-2  1 (20)  0.36  6 – 0.63 (10)  0/1 
5-4  5 (28, 31, 37, 42, 46)  0.60  3 – 0.22 (11)  1/5 
6-1  1 (8)  1.30  6 – 1.71 (1)  0/1 
6-5  7 (9, 12, 15, 18, 28, 33, 47) 1.08  6 – 1.5 (0)  1/7 
11/36  30/1800  0.98  0.77 (median: 3)  6/30 
 
Table B6: Analysis of “spoilers” in experiment LTI. For explanation  see Table B3. 
 
 
 